Application of a uniform price quality adjusted discount auction for assigning voluntary separation pay by Pearson, Quincy R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2011-03
Application of a uniform price quality adjusted
discount auction for assigning voluntary separation pay
Pearson, Quincy R.











Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
APPLICATION OF A UNIFORM PRICE QUALITY 
ADJUSTED DISCOUNT AUCTION FOR ASSIGNING 








 Thesis Co-Advisors:  Noah Myung 
   William Gates  
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2011 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
Application of a Uniform Price Quality Adjusted  Discount Auction for Assigning 
Voluntary Separation Pay 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Quincy R. Pearson 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ______NPS.2011.0015-IR-EP7-A___.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This thesis examined the feasibility of using a quality adjusted auction for retaining quality officers while assigning 
voluntary separation pay to Marine officers. The study used survey data to set parameters for the auction. Data used in 
the study was collected from a survey administered to approximately 500 officers assigned to I Marine Expeditionary 
Force, Naval Postgraduate School and Defense Language Institute. Furthermore, survey data was used to estimate the 
effects of personal, professional and economic factors on a Marine officer’s decision to participate in a voluntary 
separation program. 
Results find that a quality adjusted auction for separation can provide cost savings and improve the quality of 
officers retained. Unlike a retention auction where higher quality officers receive higher retention bonuses, higher 
quality officers receive lower separation bonuses in a quality adjusted auction for separation. Probit model estimates 
find that expected civilian pay, personal discount rate, marital status, military occupational specialty and pay grade 
had a significant effect on the probability of an officer participating in a voluntary separation program. Ordinary least 
squares estimates find that aviation and combat service support military occupational specialties, and quality score 
had a significant effect on an officer’s personal discount rate.  
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
113 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Voluntary Separation Pay, Special Separation Benefit, Voluntary 
Separation Incentive, Quality rating, auction 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
APPLICATION OF A UNIFORM PRICE QUALITY ADJUSTED DISCOUNT 
AUCTION FOR ASSIGNING VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY 
 
 
Quincy R. Pearson 
Captain, United States Marine Corps 
B.S., University of Arizona, 2005 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























William Gates, Dean 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examined the feasibility of using a quality adjusted auction for retaining 
quality officers while assigning voluntary separation pay to Marine officers. The study 
used survey data to set parameters for the auction. Data used in the study was collected 
from a survey administered to approximately 500 officers assigned to I Marine 
Expeditionary Force, Naval Postgraduate School and Defense Language Institute. 
Furthermore, survey data was used to estimate the effects of personal, professional and 
economic factors on a Marine officer’s decision to participate in a voluntary separation 
program. 
Results find that a quality adjusted auction for separation can provide cost savings 
and improve the quality of officers retained. Unlike a retention auction where higher 
quality officers receive higher retention bonuses, higher quality officers receive lower 
separation bonuses in a quality adjusted auction for separation. Probit model estimates 
find that expected civilian pay, personal discount rate, marital status, military 
occupational specialty and pay grade had a significant effect on the probability of an 
officer participating in a voluntary separation program. Ordinary least squares estimates 
find that aviation and combat service support military occupational specialties, and 
quality score had a significant effect on an officer’s personal discount rate.  
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At the end of the Cold War, the military services were asked to reduce troop 
levels, as the need for a large military force became unnecessary. During this time, 
military manpower planners faced the challenge of meeting targeted reduction goals 
while retaining quality personnel. To help the military services meet their reduction 
goals, Congress authorized the Department of Defense (DoD) to implement two 
monetary separation incentive programs: (a) the voluntary separation incentive (VSI) and 
(b) special separation benefit (SSB). Both programs fell under the 1992 and 1993 
National Defense Authorization Act and targeted military personnel with 6 to 20 years of 
service (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 1999). The intent of the programs was to 
increase the rate of voluntary separation among midcareer service members on active 
duty.  
The military drawdown in Iraq and possible reductions in military spending may 
result in a force reduction. If Congress mandates a service-wide reduction of military 
manpower, planners may face a similar challenge in meeting reduction goals while 
retaining quality personnel. Uncertainty in today’s civilian job market could potentially 
add to the challenges faced by manpower planners. Improvements in military 
compensation, job satisfaction, health benefits, and quality of life have induced more 
service members to remain on active duty rather than seek civilian employment at the end 
of service contracts. Since fewer personnel are likely to voluntarily separate, compared to 
those in the past, manpower planners need to evaluate and improve previous separation 
incentive policies. 
During the drawdown of the early 1990s, the United States military services made 
significant reductions in their officer corps. Between 1989 and 1997, the Marine Corps 
reduced its officer corps by 11%, the Air Force by 29%, the Army by 26%, and the Navy 
by 22%. The services used reduction in accessions, normal attrition, involuntary 
separations under the up-or-out system, the voluntary separation incentive, the special 
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separation benefit, and the Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) to accomplish 
their reduction goals (CBO, 1999). The effect of the voluntary separation incentive and 
special separation benefit programs on officers who chose the separation incentives is 
problematic, since a large number of officers who took advantage of the programs would 
have either separated voluntarily without the incentives or may have been involuntarily 
separated under the up-or-out system. Additionally, control measures were not 
implemented to ensure that the services were not separating quality officers. By using an 
auction mechanism as an alternative for offering separation amounts, the military services 
may: (a) achieve desired reduced force levels, (b) retain quality officers, and (c) increase 
their cost savings. 
B. PURPOSE 
The objective of this thesis was twofold. The first research area was to determine 
the feasibility of the Marine Corps using a uniform price Quality Adjusted auction to 
assign voluntary separation bonuses and retain higher quality officers. The second 
research area concerned identifying the effects of personal, professional and economic 
factors on a Marine officer’s decision to participate in a voluntary separation program. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
White (2010) examined the viability of using the quality adjusted discount 
(QUAD) auction to increase the retention rate of quality Marine aviators who receive 
aviation continuation pay. The study did not quantify the quality rating of the quality 
adjusted discount auction. This thesis attempts to quantify a quality rating for Marine 
Corps officers, which can later be applied to a quality adjusted discount auction. The 
primary research questions that will be addressed in the study are:  
 1. Is there a correlation between a quality officer and the amount of 
compensation they are willing to accept for voluntary separation? 
 2. Can a quality adjusted discount auction be used to effectively determine 
the appropriate separation pay to offer Marine officers who choose to participate in a 
voluntary separation program? 
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The secondary research questions that will be addressed in the study are: 
1. What factors make an impact on an officer’s decision to participate in a 
voluntary separation program? 
2. How does a service member’s discount rate effect his or her decision to 
stay in or leave the military? 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The study is organized into eight chapters. Chapter II develops the background 
information on the voluntary separation incentive, special separation benefit, and 
Temporary Early Retirement Authority programs. This chapter includes a literature 
review of voluntary separation incentive, special separation benefit, and auction studies. 
Chapter III provides a review of auction theory and the application of auction 
mechanisms in the military labor market. Chapter IV explains the survey development 
process and implementation and provides a summary of the preliminary results. Chapter 
V describes the process used to develop the quality score rating for use in the quality 
adjusted discount auction simulations. The remainder of the study is broken down into 
two research areas. Chapter VI provides the methodology and results for the auction 
simulations, while Chapter VII provides the methodology and results for the multivariate 
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II.  MILITARY SPECIAL AND INCENTIVE (S&I) PAY 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter reviews special and incentive pay and the policy tools used to assist 
the military services in meeting their force reduction goals. A description of special and 
incentive pay used to induce the voluntary separation of service members is the main 
focus of this chapter. The chapter concludes by identifying possible problems associated 
with previous special and incentive pay programs for separation and presents a literature 
review of prior studies.  
B. OVERVIEW OF MILITARY SPECIAL AND INCENTIVE PAY 
Special and incentive pay for military service members is authorized under 
Chapter 5, Title 37 of the United States Military Code. Basic pay and pay increases do 
not sufficiently address all of the force management needs of the military services. 
Military services depend on special and incentive pay to address specific manning needs, 
such as: (a) retaining additional service members, (b) separating service members, and (c) 
attracting service members to understaffed positions or specialties (Coughlan & Gates, 
2010).  
Currently, none of the 60 plus special and incentive pays are applied to military 
separation. However, special and incentive pays in the form of voluntary separation 
incentive pay, were used in the past. Separation incentive programs used during the 
military drawdown of the 1990s were authorized under the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993. The programs included voluntary 
separation incentive (VSI), the special separation benefit (SSB) and the temporary early 
retirement authority (TERA). The programs were designed to encourage service members 
to leave the military voluntarily and provided manpower planners more flexibility in 
attaining their desired force structure goals.  
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1. Eligibility Criteria for the VSI/SSB Program       
While the eligibility criteria for the voluntary separation incentive and the special 
separation benefit program applied to all services, the military service secretaries had the 
authority to establish other requirements based on years of service, military occupational 
specialty (MOS), rank, and remaining time of obligated service (Noblit, 1993). The 
Department of Defense (DoD) established the following eligibility criteria for the 
VSI/SSB program: 
1. The service member must have served on active duty for more than six 
years before 5 December 1992. 
2. The service member must have completed his or her initial term of 
enlistment or obligation, including any extensions. 
3. The service member must have served at least five years of continuous 
active duty immediately preceding the date of separation. 
4. The service member must have served on active duty, upon separation, for 
less than 20 years and not be eligible for retired or retainer pay. 
5. The service member must be a regular or a reservist on the active duty list. 
2. Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) 
The voluntary separation incentive program offered eligible service members who 
chose voluntary separation from the military an annuity payment. The voluntary 
separation incentive annuity is an annual payment equal to the service member's years of 
service multiplied by 2.5% of the service member's basic pay (voluntary separation 
incentive annuity = 2.5% x final monthly basic pay x 12 months x years of service).  The 
payment period equals twice the number of years served by the officer under the 
condition that the service member continues to serve in a reserve component for no less 
than 3 years. Service members who received voluntary separation incentive payments are 
not eligible to receive reserve pay (Viltz, 2004).  
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3. Special Separation Benefit (SSB) 
As an alternative to the voluntary separation incentive, the special separation 
benefit   offered eligible service members who chose voluntary separation from the 
military a lump sum payment. The special separation benefit lump sum is a one-time 
payment equal to 15% of the service member’s final monthly pay multiplied by the 
number of years served (special separation benefit lump sum = 15% x final monthly basic 
pay x 12 months x years of service). Similar to the voluntary separation incentive 
requirements service members who received the special separation benefit  payment are 
required to serve in a reserve component for no less than 3 years following separation 
from active duty (Viltz, 2004). 
4. Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) 
The temporary early retirement authority program offered service members the 
option of retiring after only 15 years of service. Service members had to have served at 
least 15 years but less than 20 years on active duty to be eligible for the program. Under 
the temporary early retirement authority, service members received similar retirement 
benefits offered to other retirees, but their actual payments were less.  
The temporary early retirement authority allowed service members to gain points 
towards retirement by working in a civil service job between the time of early retirement 
and the date they would have retired at 20 years of service. A service member would 
receive 50% of his or her base pay at age 62 if he or she worked in an approved job 
(Reppert, 2004). 
C. PROBLEMS 
While the military services appeared to be successful in using the separation 
incentive pay to shape their forces and meet their manpower goals, it was burdened with 
two main problems. The military services could not distinguish between service 
members who needed the voluntary separation incentive and the special separation 
benefit programs to leave and those who would have left without utilizing the programs. 
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As a result, the services paid excess monies to service members who would have left the 
military without the separation incentive payment (Reppert, 2004). The excess payment 
is known as economic rent and is defined as an extra benefit received by personnel, as a 
result of a program (Reppert, 2004). A second problem involved the voluntary 
separation incentive, the special separation benefit, and a temporary early retirement 
authority program is that the programs did not place emphasis on retaining quality 
service members. The military services expected to separate low performing service 
members and retain quality performers. Since all service members who met the 
eligibility criteria for the separation programs were given the opportunity to participate, 
regardless of their level of performance, it is possible that quality performers were 
separated from the military. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The behavior of military personnel in reacting to the voluntary separation 
incentive, the special separation benefit, and the use of auction mechanisms as an 
alternative to special and incentive pay and bonuses will be explored. The study will 
investigate studies on the voluntary separation incentive and special separation benefit 
that highlight two main weaknesses of the early separation incentive programs. The 
military services paid economic rents to some service members and separated quality 
performers. The study will explore present studies where the application of auction 
theory is used to promote reduced cost saving to the United States Department of 
Defense.   
1. VSI/SSB Studies 
a. Study by Beth J. Asch and John T. Warner (2001) 
Asch and Warner's (2001) study evaluated the efficacy of the voluntary 
separation incentive and the special separation benefit programs. The authors explored 
whether or not the programs: (a) induced substantial separations over and above what 
would normally occur and (b)  induced more low-quality personnel to leave than high-
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quality. The authors compared Army enlisted personnel separations during calendar years 
1989 and 1992. Individuals were tracked during the 12-month period to determine who 
stayed and who separated from the Army. The data used in their study came from the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). 
Asch and Warner (2001) hypothesized that low quality personnel would 
take the voluntary separation incentive and the special separation benefit offer more often 
than high-quality personnel. They defined a high-quality service member as an enlistee 
who has a high school diploma and placed in the top one-half of the armed forces 
qualification test (AFQT) score distribution. The results of their study found that while 
the voluntary separation incentive and the special separation benefit programs increased 
separations by 100% the Department of Defense paid economic rents to about one-half of 
the eligible personnel who left with the voluntary separation incentive and the special 
separation benefit. The Department of Defense paid the personnel to leave when they 
would have separated even without the program. 
Asch and Warner (2001) found that the voluntary separation incentive and 
the special separation benefit program increased the probability of separation by 10 
percentage points for high-quality personnel, which made up about 40% of the eligible 
population. Results of Asch and Warner's study provided evidence that the Army 
voluntarily separated high-quality personnel and paid economic rent to about one-half of 
their personnel who accepted the voluntary separation incentive and the special 
separation benefit offer.  
b. Study by Marvin M. Smith (1999) 
Smith's (1999) study used officer separation data from the United States 
Department of Defense to examine: (a) the different approaches the military services used 
in reducing their officer corps during the post Cold War drawdown and (b) the effects the 
drawdown had on the composition of the officer corps. When examining the effects of 




were currently on active duty by significantly reducing officer accessions. The large cut 
in officer accessions led to an officer corps becoming more senior in years of service and 
rank (Smith, 1999). 
The military services increased the rate of separation among officers who 
were on active duty by offering the voluntary separation incentive, the special separation 
benefit, and temporary early retirement authority programs. Smith (1999) suggested that 
although the voluntary separation incentive and the special separation benefit programs 
were successful in reducing the level of officer corps, more than 50% of the officers who 
accepted the programs may have separated without them. During the drawdown period, 
the average special separation benefit payment for a captain in the Army and Air Force 
were $58,200 and $50,900, respectively. Since one-half of the special separation benefit 
recipients would have separated without the offer, the Army and Air Force paid twice as 
much as they needed to voluntary separate captains (Smith, 1999). The payment of 
economic rent to those officers who would have voluntarily separated without the 
voluntary separation incentive and the special separation benefit was a significant cost to 
the Department of Defense. 
c. Study by Mark L. Noblit (1993) 
Noblit's study (1993) accessed data from the headquarters of the Marine 
Corps' enlisted master file to estimate and forecast enlisted Marine take-rates for the 
voluntary separation incentive and the special separation benefit programs. Noblit used 
logic regressions to predict the probability that a Marine takes the programs. The data 
accounted for enlisted Marines who participated in the programs before June 30, 1992. 
Results of Noblit's study (1993) indicated that when compared to Marines 
with faster promotion rates “Marines who were promoted to their current pay grade at a 
slower than average rate for their particular military occupational specialty are less likely 
to take the voluntary separation incentive and the special separation benefit offer” (p. 62). 




promotion rate indicates a low performer, the author's study suggested that higher 
performers were more likely to accept the voluntary separation incentive and the special 
separation benefit. 
d. Study by F. Rogge (1996) 
Rogge (1996) used data from the defense manpower data center to 
estimate the true separation rates of naval officers during fiscal year 1993 and of Navy 
enlisted personnel during fiscal year 1992 using the annualized cost of leaving (ACOL) 
framework. The author used multivariate probity regressions with a binary dependent 
variable. The dependent variable was coded 1, if the individual stayed on active duty, and 
0, if the individual separated with either the voluntary separation incentive or special 
separation benefit option. 
The results of the officer model found that 68.9% of the officers who 
received the voluntary separation incentive and the special separation benefit payment 
would have separated from the military without the voluntary separation incentive, and 
the special separation benefit offer yielding a $33.24 million excessive payment to the 
officers. The remaining 31.1% of the officers were induced to leave due to a bonus. The 
enlisted model found that 96% of the enlisted personnel who received the voluntary 
separation incentive and the special separation benefit payment would have separated 
from the military without the offer, and 4% were induced to leave due to a bonus. Both 
models provide evidence that the Navy paid economic rents to service members who 
participated in the voluntary separation incentive and special separation benefit.  
2. Auctions as an Alternative to S&I Pay and Bonuses 
Studies revealed the use of auction mechanisms as an alternative to assigning 
special and incentive pay and bonus amounts from different approaches. The assignment 
incentive pay program uses a standard reverse auction method. The framework of a 
sequential self-selection auction mechanism predicts behavior based on opportunity cost.  
The quality adjusted discount auction theory utilizes the quality of personnel retained.  
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a. Study by H. Golding, E. Christensen, and D. Lien (2002) 
Golding, Christensen, and Lien (2002) evaluated the cost and benefits of 
the Navy’s assignment incentive pay (AIP) program. The program uses an auction to 
encourage sailors to be voluntarily assigned to hard-to-fill billets. Under the auction 
eligible sailors submit $50 incremental bids, for a maximum of $2,500, to indicate his or 
her willingness to be assigned to a specific billet. The sailor who submits the lowest bid 
wins the auction and is assigned to the auctioned billet. When comparing the assignment 
incentive pay program to the previous methods of assigning sailors to hard-to-fill billets 
the authors found that “combining the retention costs and lower bound cost of sea duty 
credit, we estimate that the costs of the current assignment system and incentives exceed 
$116 million annually” (Golding, Christensen, & Lien, 2002, p. 3). 
b. Study by P. Bock (2007) 
Bock (2007) explored the cost savings for the Marine Corps by replacing 
its current selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) program with a sequential self-selection 
auction mechanism (S3AM). The theoretical framework of the mechanism predicts a 
Marine's behavior based on opportunity cost. The author applied opportunity cost to a 
Marine’s willingness to accept a long-term verses short-term reenlistment contract and 
hypothesized that: (a) a Marine with a low opportunity cost for active duty would accept 
a long-term contract with a lower bonus and (b) a Marine with a high opportunity cost for 
active duty would accept a short-term contract with a higher bonus. 
Using data from the Marine Corps’ zone A population from fiscal year 
2006 for three military occupational specialties, as the sample for the sequential self-
selection auction mechanism, Bock (2007) found that paying a Marine a monetary sum 
that is similar to his or her active duty opportunity cost reduced the payment of economic 
rent. The study showed that if a sequential self-selection auction mechanism was used 
instead of the current selective reenlistment bonus program, the Marine Corps could save 
approximately 3 million dollars when assigning selective reenlistment bonus amounts to 
Marines in those three military occupational specialties.  
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c. Study by C. White (2010) 
White (2010) explored auction theory research for assigning special and 
incentive pay and bonuses by controlling the quality of personnel retained. He 
investigated a uniform price quality adjusted discount auction model to assign aviation 
continuation pay (ACP) to eligible Marine Corps aviators. The model controls for quality 
by assigning a quality rating. Each officer who met the predetermined quality rating was 
given a monetary sum in addition to the cut off amount established by the auction. White 
addressed two major problems with the current aviation continuation pay program. Both 
of the problems were prevalent when the voluntary separation incentive and the special 
separation benefit program were implemented. Assignment of aviation continuation pay 
does not account for the quality of aviators being retained. There was no consideration 
for the economic rent paid to aviators who would have remained on active duty for a 
lower aviation continuation pay bonus and those who would have remained without the 
aviation continuation pay bonus. 
To illustrate the cost saving and benefits of using a uniform price quality 
adjusted discount auction model, White (2010) used the average long-term aviation 
continuation pay bonus for fiscal year 2009 as a baseline. He proposed a scenario where 
the Marine Corps set a goal of retaining 15 out of 25 officers for a specific military 
occupational specialty. In the scenario, he compared the cost to retain 15 aviators using 
the current aviation continuation pay 6 year contact with a standard uniform price auction 
and a uniform price quality adjusted discount auction.  
The results showed that, compared to the current aviation continuation pay 
program, a uniform price auction reduced the cost to retain an additional aviator by 
$4,483. Considering the Marine Corps retained 330 aviators in fiscal year 2009 the total 
cost to retain them could have been reduced by 28%. When comparing the uniform price 
auction with a quality adjusted discount auction, the results showed that the quality 
adjusted discount auction reduced aviation continuation pay savings by $4,885 per 
aviator and increased the quality of the aviators being retained.  
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The military special and incentive pay gives the military services flexibility to 
manage and shape their force structure. During the drawdown of the early 1990s, special 
and incentive pay in the form of a voluntary separation incentive, the special separation 
benefit, and temporary early retirement authority programs were used by the services to 
attain desired force structure goals. Although the separation incentive programs appeared 
to be successful, the military services paid: (a) economic rent to participants who would 
have left the military without the separation incentive offer and (b) separated personnel 
who were quality performers.  
A review of several studies provided evidence that the Department of Defense 
paid economic rents to service members who would have separated without the voluntary 
separation incentive and the special separation benefit offer resulting in voluntarily 
separated quality service members. Prior research has shown that auction mechanisms 
can be more cost effective when applied to the selective reenlistment bonus and other 
special and incentive pay programs. Applying similar auction mechanisms to separation 
incentives and bonuses could reduce the payment of excess economic rent to service 












III. AUCTION THEORY 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter draws from prior auction studies authored by Kyle P. Hahn, Pete 
Coughlan and Bill Gates, Christopher White and Brooke Zimmerman. The chapter serves 
two purposes. The first purpose of this chapter is to provide a basic understanding of 
auctions. The second purpose is to: 1) discuss the application of auctions in the military 
labor market and 2) show the cost savings that can be achieved using an auction for 
assigning voluntary separation bonuses. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Dating back to 500 B.C., auctions have been used in the civilian market place as a 
mechanism to sell goods and services. Auctions are defined as “an economic mechanism 
whose purpose is the allocation of goods (or services) and the formation of prices for 
those goods (or services) via a process known as bidding” (Henderson, 2007, p. 21). 
Auctions in the civilian market place consist of a variety of transactions between two 
primary participants, the sellers and the buyers. The role of each participant is dependent 
on the type of transaction being conducted. For instance, when there is a single seller and 
multiple buyers the seller is the individual who has a good or service to be auctioned. The 
buyers are those individuals who compete by submitting bids for the right to purchase the 
good or service to be auctioned. The type of auction is known as a forward auction. When 
there is a single buyer and multiple sellers, the sellers are those individuals who compete 
by submitting bids for the right to sell their goods or services. The buyer is the individual 
who purchases by accepting bids for the goods or services from the sellers. The type of 
auction is known as a reverse auction.  
C. VALUE 
An inherent characteristic to auctions is the value the buyer and seller places on 
the goods or services. A buyer’s value is reflected in his or her reservation price. In a 
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forward auction a buying bidder’s reservation price is the maximum amount or 
opportunity cost each bidder is willing to pay for the goods or services. In a reverse 
auction, the bidding sellers’ reservation price is the minimum amount each bidder is 
willing to accept for their goods or services. A seller’s value is reflected in his or her 
reserve price. In a forward auction, the seller’s reserve price is the minimum amount the 
seller is willing to accept for goods or services. In a reverse auction, the reserve price is 
the maximum amount the buyer is willing to pay for goods or services. 
D. BIDDING PROCESS 
Another characteristic of auctions is the bidding process. The bidding process is 
the way in which buyers in a forward auction and sellers in a reverse auction submit their 
bids.  There are generally two ways of submitting bids in an auction: (a) open bids and 
(b) sealed bids. In an open bid forward auction the buyer competes by publicly raising his 
or her bid until a winner is announced. The winner is the buyer who submits the highest 
bid. In an open bid reverse auction the seller competes by publicly lowering his or her bid 
until a winner is announced. The winner is the seller who submits the lowest bid.  
Unlike the open bid auctions, bidding in a sealed bid auction is private and 
bidders are only allowed to submit one bid. Competing bidders are not able to observe 
other bids, and bidders cannot adjust their bids. Once the submitted bids are opened 
simultaneously, the winner is the buyer who submitted the highest bid in a sealed bid 
forward auction and seller who submitted the lowest bid in a sealed bid reverse auction.  
E. AUCTIONS IN THE MILITARY LABOR MARKET 
In the military labor market, auctions are generally sealed bid reverse auctions 
where multiple sellers represented by military service members compete by submitting 
monetary bids to sell their labor commitments such as retention, separation, or transfer to 
a single buyer represented by the Department of Defense (Coughlan & Gates, 2010). 
Service members interested in staying in or leaving the military could submit bids for 
retention or separation. Based on targeted end strength goals, the services would decide 
how many retention or separation bonuses need to be awarded. Service members who 
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submit the lowest bids are the winners and would either be retained or separated. For 
example, if the Marine Corps want to separate 20 officers in a particular military 
occupational specialty officers who submit the 20 lowest bids are the winners and would 
receive a separation bonus. 
Coughlan and Gates (2010) suggested that compared to traditional methods of 
assigning military retention bonuses, a retention auction can be more precise, cost 
effective, flexible, and induce voluntary participation. The same outcomes can be 
achieved applying auctions for assigning voluntary separation bonuses. While there are 
several variations of auctions that are applicable to the military labor market, prior studies 
promoted using a uniform price reverse auction. The uniform price reverse auction and its 
application for assigning voluntary separation bonuses will be examined. For a detailed 
explanation of bidding strategies, and the various types of auctions and their applications 
as military force management tools refer to: Coughlan, Peter J., Gates, William R., 
“Auction Mechanisms for Defense Management,” in Parco, James E., Levy, David A. 
(eds.)“Attitudes Aren’t Free: Thinking Deeply about Diversity in the U.S. Armed 
Forces,” Chapter 28. 
1. Uniform Price Reverse Auction 
The uniform price reverse auction is the multiple winner generalization of the 
second price sealed bid reverse auction where all winning bidders receive the same 
payment amount. The winning bidders are those who submit the lowest bid, but the actual 
payment they would receive is equal to the losing bidder who came closest to winning or 
the first excluded bid. For instance, in a uniform price reverse auction where there are 20 
winners the 20 lowest sellers would receive a payment equal to the twenty-first lowest 
bid submitted.  
Similar to the second price sealed bid reverse auction the optimal bidding strategy 
is for the sellers to bid their true reservation value in a uniform price reverse auction. If a 
person is bidding on an item they believe is valued at $100, then optimal bidding strategy 
is to bid exactly $100. If the bidder bids above his or her true reservation value of $100, 
then he or she risks bidding a price that is too high and could lose the auction. If the 
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bidder bids below his or her reservation value of $100, then he or she risks winning the 
auction at a price that is below their true reservation value when he or she may have won and 
received a payment at or above their true reservation value. As it pertains to a uniform price 
reverse auction for assigning voluntary separation bonuses, the reservation value is the 
minimum payment a service member would accept to voluntarily leave the military.  
To illustrate the cost savings that can be achieved using a uniform price reverse 
auction instead of the special separation benefit program for assigning a voluntary 
separation bonus, the following scenario reveals the outcome. Suppose during post-Cold 
War drawdown the Marine Corps wanted to reduce the number of captains with 6 to 8 
years of service in a specific military occupational specialty. There are 50 captains in the 
military occupational specialty and the Marine Corps wants to separate 30% of the officers. 
Using the special separation benefit lump sum formula, the average captain with 6 to 8 years 
of service would receive a payment of $46,219 using a 1992 military pay chart. Under the 
special separation benefit program, $46,219 is a fixed amount and all captains with 6 to 8 
years of service would receive a payment of $46,219, regardless of whether individuals 
would have separated for less money. Using the special separation benefit program, it would 
cost the Marine Corps $693,285 for separation bonuses for 15 officers. Fifty percent of the 
cost or $346,642.50 was economic rent paid to officers who would have separated without 
the special separation benefit offer or for a lesser special separation benefit payment amount.  
The Marine Corps could reduce the cost associated with separating the 15 officers 
using a uniform price auction. In the auction, multiple sellers represented by captains 
with 6 to 8 years of service would compete by submitting sealed bids reflected by their 
true reservation value to sell their labor commitment or separation to the Marine Corps. 
In the scenario described above, if the reservation value for each officer participating in 
the auction is uniformly distributed between $0 and $70,000, the Marine Corps would 
pay separation bonuses to the 15 officers who submit the lowest bids. The amount paid to 
the 15 winning officers would equal the amount submitted by the sixteenth lowest bidder 
or first excluded bid. Table 1 illustrates the results of a uniform price auction for 
separating 15 officers in a specific MOS. In the auction randomly generated bids ranging 
from $0 to $70,000 are used to denote the reservation values of 50 officers participating 
in the auction. 
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Table 1.   Uniform Price Reverse Auction for a Given Marine Corps MOS 
Rank Bid Separated Bonus Received 
50  69544  0    
49  60836  0    
48  55579  0    
47  54537  0    
46  54425  0    
45  51541  0    
44  51075  0    
43  49845  0    
42  48972  0    
41  48317  0    
40  47227  0    
39  45675  0    
38  45301  0    
37  45138  0    
36  43442  0    
35  42082  0    
34  40657  0    
33  40509  0    
32  38172  0    
31  35498  0    
30  35223  0    
29  35220  0    
28  35003  0    
27  34538  0    
26  34287  0    
25  33290  0    
24  33271  0    
23  30939  0    
22  30298  0    
21  29927  0    
20  29786  0    
19  29135  0    
18  27469  0    
17  27441  0    
16  26806  0    
15  26696  1  26806 
14  21744  1  26806 
13  21430  1  26806 
12  21366  1  26806 
11  19118  1  26806 
10  18900  1  26806 
9  17685  1  26806 
8  16791  1  26806 
7  16480  1  26806 
6  16128  1  26806 
5  15809  1  26806 
4  13113  1  26806 
3  7581  1  26806 
2  2309  1  26806 
1  1678  1  26806 
Total Separation Bonus paid $402,090.00 
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The results showed that significant cost savings were achieved using a uniform 
price reverse auction in lieu of the special separation benefit lump sum to assign 
voluntary separation bonuses. The amount paid to the 15 winning officers was $26,806, 
the sixteenth lowest bid, or first excluded bid, which is considerably less than the average 
amount of $46,219 paid under the special separation benefit option.  
2. Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD) Auction 
In today’s military, one of the main manpower goals is to increase the quality of 
enlisted and officer service members while reducing manpower cost. To do so, the 
military services must recruit and retain highly qualified service members. Prior auction 
studies generally concentrate on how manpower planners can reduce the cost and 
increase the efficiency associated with assigning special incentive pay and bonuses. 
These studies rarely examine the quality of personnel receiving the special incentive pay 
and bonus. White (2010) explored using a quality adjusted discount auction to assign 
aviation continuation pay to eligible aviation officers while attempting to retain higher 
quality aviation officers. The author was the first to apply a control measure for the 
quality of personnel when using an auction mechanism. 
a. Quality Adjusted Discount Auction (QUAD) for Retention 
The quality adjusted discount auction is a uniform price reverse auction 
which controls for quality by providing a monetary discount payment to bidders with 
higher quality ratings. The auction works under the assumption that a higher quality 
bidder would have a higher reservation value and will submit higher bids. Bidders with 
the predetermined quality rating of q* or greater would have their bids reduced by $A to 
compensate for their higher reservation value. Like all reverse auctions the quality 
adjusted discount is characterized by a single buyer; whereby, the single buyer is the 
Department of Defense and the multiple sellers are military service members.   
During the quality adjusted discount auction, the objective of the bidder, 
Oi,  represented by service members, is to maximize his or her payoff (pi) by submitting a 
bid (bi) that reflects his or her true reservation value (ri) for staying on active duty.  
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The objective of the buyer represented by the Department of Defense, is to retain M 
number of service members at the lowest cost. In a retention context, the model assumes 
that an assistance of $A dollars is authorized for any service member with a quality rating 










   
 
The buyers then rank all quality adjusted bids from highest to lowest and retain the X 
number of service members with the lowest bi*. All service members who are retained 
are paid an amount equal to the first excluded bid. In this case, the first excluded bid is 
the X+1 service member who bids b*. Any service members with a quality adjusted bid 










    
 
b. Quality Adjusted Discount Auction (QUAD) for Separation 
This section draws from a memo on QUAD auctions conducted by Dr. 
Noah Myung at the Naval Postgraduate School. In his memo, the QUAD model 
described above is modified to a voluntary separation application. As a separation auction 
for voluntarily separating Marine Corps Officers, the single buyer in the QUAD auction 
is represented by the Marine Corps manpower planners and the multiple sellers were 
represented by Marine officers who voluntarily choose to participate in the auction. Like 
a QUAD auction for retention, the QUAD auction for separation would control for 
quality by providing a monetary assistance of ($A) to the bids of officers with higher 
quality ratings (q*).  
In this QUAD auction, the objective of the Marine officers is to maximize 
their payoff (pi) by submitting a bid (bi) that reflects his or her true reservation value (ri) 
for separating from the military. The objective of the buyer represented by the Marine 
Corps Manpower Planners was to separate N number of officers at the lowest cost. The 
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model assumes that an assistance of $A is authorized for any officer with a quality rating 










    
 
Marine manpower planner (USMCMP)  then rank all quality adjusted bids 
from highest to lowest and separate the M number of officers with the lowest quality 
adjusted bid (bi*).  Therefore, USMCMP will retain the N−M most expensive bidders. 
All officers who are separated are paid an amount equal to the first excluded bid. In this 
case, the first excluded bid is the M+1 officer who bid b*. Any officer with a quality 










   
 
To illustrate the auction process, the following scenario reveals the 
outcome. Two officers are bidding in a quality adjusted discount auction for separation. 
Both officers bid (bi) $60,000, but officer A has the required quality rating (q*) and 
officer B does not. Marine manpower planners are authorized to provide ($A) $10,000. 
Since officer A has the required quality rating his or her initial bid is increased by 
$10,000 (bi + $A). Officer A’s quality adjusted bid (bi*) is $70,000. Officer B does not 
have the required quality rating and his or her quality adjusted bid (bi*) is his initial bid of 
$60,000. The quality adjusted bids are ranked and the first excluded bid in the auction is 
$80,000. Since both officers' quality adjusted bids are less than $80,000, they are selected 
for separation. The higher quality officer A will receive a payment of $70,000 (bi* - $A), 
which is lower than officer B who receives a payment of $80,000. If a quality adjusted 
discount auction is used for assigning voluntary separation bonuses, higher quality 
officers will receive lower separation bonuses than low quality officers. 
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F. BIDDING STRATEGY IN A QUAD AUCTION FOR SEPARATION 
Since officers are not separated if their bids are rejected, the optimal bidding 
strategy is to bid one’s true reservation value. Therefore, an officer’s bid should 
accurately reflect his or her true reservation value for separating from the military. To 
illustrate how an officer can do no better than bidding truthfully, consider the following 
example. A quality officer is participating in a QUAD auction for separation. His 
reservation value for separating from the military is $100,000. Thus, his bid for 
separation should reflect this amount. A quality adjustment allowance of $10,000 is 
authorized. The officer can choose one of three bidding strategies: overbidding, 
underbidding and bidding his or her true reservation value. Table 2 shows the results 
from using the three bidding strategies when the cutoff bids, or first excluded bid, are 
$115,000, $110,000 and $105,000. 
Table 2.   Optimal Bidding Strategy in a QUAD Auction for Separation 
Reservation 
Value:$100,000 
If Cutoff Bid is 
$115,000 
If Cutoff Bid is 
$110,000 
If Cutoff Bid is 
$105,000 













Table 2 illustrates that it is not optimal to overbid or under bid. Whenever the 
officer overbids they face the possibility they will lose the auction and be retained when 
they would prefer to accept the separation bonus. For instance, when the officer overbids 
at $110,000 and the cutoff bid is $115,000, the officer’s quality adjusted bid is $120,000. 
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Since the quality adjusted bid is greater than the cutoff bid, the officer is retained at his 
opportunity cost for leaving the military. When the officer underbids, he or she risks 
winning the auction at price less than their reservation value. For instance, when the 
officer underbids at $90,000 and the cutoff bid is $105,000, the officer’s quality adjusted 
bid is $110,000. Since the quality adjusted bid is less than the cutoff bid, the officer is 
separated and receives $95,000. This amount is less than his or her opportunity cost for 
leaving the military.  
The table also illustrates that by bidding’s one’s true reservation value the officer 
will always receive an amount greater than or equal to their opportunity cost for 
separating from the military. Therefore, the officer can do no better than truthfully 
bidding his or her reservation value. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The study has examined auctions and their application to the military. The study 
focused on the effectiveness of a uniform price reverse auction and its application to: (a) 
assigning separation bonuses and (b) retaining high-quality personnel. As an alternative 
mechanism for assigning voluntary separation lump sum bonuses, the uniform price 
reverse auction can be a cost effective means of reducing the substantial economic rent 
associated with traditional separation incentive programs.  
To retain quality personnel, the auction must be modified. The modified auction is 
called a quality adjusted discount and involves assigning a monetary assistance to higher 
quality personnel. Higher quality officers who were separated would receive a lower 
bonus than low quality officers. Under other normative economics, such as pareto-
optimality, for example, efficiency rather than fairness is considered. Giving everything 
to one person and zero to everyone else is efficient under pareto-optimality (Myung, 
2011). It is necessary to pay less to higher quality officers for the quality adjusted 




IV. VOLUNTARY SEPARATION SURVEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The study posits that there should be a strong positive correlation between a 
higher quality officer and the amount of compensation he or she would accept to 
voluntarily separate from the military. Higher quality officers were expected to have 
higher reservation values. To test the hypothesis, it was necessary to establish a matrix 
which attempts to quantify the attributes of a quality Marine Corps officer. A survey 
administered to approximately 500 Marine Corps officers assigned to the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Marine Corps detachment at the, Presidio of Monterey, and I 
Marine Corps Expeditionary Force (MEF) was used to measure attributes of a quality 
officer. 
B. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT, PRE-TESTING AND APPROVAL 
The questions in the survey were developed based on factors that: (a) determine a 
quality officer and (b) influence a Marine’s decision to stay or leave the military. Factors 
include promotion potential, performance, outside civilian pay offers, marital-dependent 
status, graduate education, leadership experience, and time spent in primary military 
occupational specialty. To maximize the effectiveness of the survey, a draft version of the 
survey was pretested with a small cohort of Marine Corps officers in the graduate school 
of business and public policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. A request was sent to 
chief of staff of I Marine Corps Expeditionary Force and the commanding officer of 
Marine Corps detachment, Presidio of Monterey to obtain approval to administer the 
survey to unrestricted officers assigned to their units. 
After making revisions from the pretest and receiving approval from I Marine 
Corps Expeditionary Force and Marine Corps detachment, Presidio of Monterey an 
application was submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School's institutional review board 
(IRB). The review board is responsible for approving all research that involves contact 
with human subjects. Once the survey and protocol proposed for the study were reviewed 
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and approved by the Naval Postgraduate School's IRB the survey was administered to 
Marine Corps officers assigned to Naval Postgraduate School, Marine Corps detachment, 
Presidio of Monterey and I Marine Corps Expeditionary Force. 
C. SURVEY DELIVERY MECHANISM 
To administer the survey to officers at I Marine Corps Expeditionary Force an 
electronic mail was sent to I Marine Corps Expeditionary Force’s assistant chief of staff 
requesting he disseminate the survey invitation to all officers in I Marine Corps 
Expeditionary Force. After obtaining the electronic mail addresses of all Naval 
Postgraduate School and Defense Language Institute (DLI) officers a mass electronic 
mail was sent inviting them to participate in the survey. The electronic mail invitation 
included: (a) an explanation of the survey’s purpose, (b) the link to the survey, and (c) 
that all responses were voluntary and anonymous.  
In both cases, the survey was administered using Survey Monkey which is an 
online data collection service. The survey was available to I Marine Corps Expeditionary 
Force officers from December 13 to December 27, 2010, and to officers at Naval 
Postgraduate School and Defense Language Institute from January 12 to January 26, 
2011. The survey is currently closed and a copy is included in Appendix A.  
D. POPULATION AND SAMPLE STATISTICS 
According to the most recent report on population representation in the military, 
there are 17,833 unrestricted officers in the Marine Corps. The survey was distributed to 
approximately 500 unrestricted officers or 2.8% of the Marine Corps' officer population. 
Of the 231 responses collected, an average of 26 questions were skipped. The response 
rate for the survey was 41%.  
The survey sample provided a fairly approximate representation of the Marine 
Corps' officer population. A comparison of socio-demographic characteristics in the 
sample and Marine Corps' officer population is shown in Table 3. Hispanics and Asians 
were overrepresented in the sample, and African Americas were underrepresented in the 
sample. Officers with the rank of O-3 and O-4 were overrepresented and with the rank of 
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O-1 were underrepresented. Of the total sample, captains and male participants accounted 
for 42.1% and 95.8%, respectively. Married participants totaled 72.6% and the average 
years of service were 12 years. About 22% of the sample had a graduate education. 
Table 3.   Population and Sample Statistics 
 
 
E. RESULTS   
The survey provided the necessary data to conduct all analysis in the study. The 
primary goals of the survey were: (a) to identify the minimum compensation a Marine 
officer would accept for voluntary separation and (b) to collect data to establish a quality 
score rating to be used in a quality adjusted discount auction. The secondary focus of the 
survey was to ascertain the likelihood of Marine officers’ participation in a voluntary 
separation program and to collect data to conduct regression analysis.  
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1. Voluntary Separation Participation 
Regarding participation in a voluntary separation program 22.3% of respondents 
reported that they were likely to participate, 21.5% were unsure, and 56.2% reported they 
were unlikely to participate or would not consider voluntary separation. Figure 1 
summarizes the distribution of the most common responses for not participating in a 
voluntary separation program. Sixty percent of the respondents indicated that retirement 
benefits were the primary reason for not participating in a voluntary separation program. 
The average year of service in the sample was more than 10 years. Officers with 10 plus 
years of service have a vested interest in the military as a career which is economically 
worthwhile for them to take advantage of retirement benefits.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Responses for Not Participating in a Voluntary Separation Program 
2. Reservation Value (Lump Sum Payment) 
One of the most important aspects of an efficient auction mechanism was for 
individuals to bid a price that reflected his or her true reservation value. To determine a 
Marine officer’s reservation value for separating from the military, participants were 
asked the following question: What is the minimum monetary compensation you would 
require to be voluntarily separated from the military?  
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Of the 205 completed surveys, only 177 responses to the question were useful. 
Twenty six observations were deleted because respondents failed to provide a dollar 
amount. Respondents either entered not applicable or unknown, as a response to the 
question. The remaining two observations were deleted because the participants entered 
unrealistic dollar amounts. The values seem to indicate that no amount of compensation 
would induce the respondents to voluntarily separate from the military. Table 4 lists the 
average reservation values or lump sum bonus the respondents would be willing to accept 
in exchange for voluntary separation. 








Average Years of 
Service (YOS) 
O-1 5 $170,000.00 $195,576.07 2 yrs 4 months
O-1E 2 $55,000.00 $7,071.07 7 yrs
O-2 28 $82,300.00 $95,273.90 3 yrs 6 months
O-2E 8 $232,500.00 $395,618.86 11 yrs 2 months
O-3 54 $249,629.00 $318,871.26 8 yrs
O-3E 20 $592,500.00 $669,222.84 15 yrs 6 months
O-4 47 $360,212.00 $395,972.88 14 yrs 8 months
O-5 11 $247,272.00 $419,478.03 20 yrs 4 months
O-6 2 $85,000.00 $49,497.47 28 yrs
Sample  177 $284,000.00 $399,081.92 10 yrs 8 months
 
With the exception of second lieutenants, prior enlisted first lieutenants and 
captains had significantly higher average reservation values than their non prior 
counterparts. This suggests that prior enlisted officers would require a more lucrative 
separation offer to induce voluntary separation from the military. The average reservation 
values for field grade officers decreased with rank and years of service. Lieutenant 
colonels and colonels had more years of service but lower average reservation values 
compared to majors. The decreased average reservation values associated with field grade 




field grades, such as lieutenant colonel and colonel leaving the military, would receive 
retirement benefits in addition to their expected civilian earnings so they could afford to 
accept a lower lump sum payment.  
a. Comparison Between Survey Lump Sum, SSB Payment and 
Retirement Pay Forgone 
When offered to participate in a voluntary separation program, a Marine 
officer must make a decision to either accept the separation offer or refuse the offer and 
remain on active duty with the expectation of reaching retirement. There are several 
factors that influence the decision to accept a lump sum payment: expected civilian pay, 
availability of jobs in civilian labor market, retirement pay foregone, marital status and 
number of dependent. The study will focus on comparing the present value of a lump sum 
payment with the retirement pay forgone. The average lump sum requested by captains 
with 8 years of service will be compared with the lump sum he or she would receive 
under the special separation benefit program.  
To calculate the retirement pay streams for Captains with 8 years average 
YOS, this study used the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) military 
compensation High-3 retirement calculator (Office of the Secretary of Defense, reference 
2, n. d.). The following assumptions were made:  
1. All captains were promoted to O-4 before retirement. 
2. Individuals retire with 20 years of service in 2011 under the High-
3 retirement option.  
  3. Forty-years old at retirement.  
  4. An individual lives 40 years past retirement. 
5. Economic conditions include a 2% inflation rate, 2% annual active 
duty pay raise, and a 25% tax rate. 
Based on the special separation benefit calculations, the average lump sum 
payment requested by captains with 8 years of service was more than three times the 
amount when compared to the previous method of assigning special separation benefit 
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bonuses. Captains requested an average lump sum of $249,629 which is far more than the 
$78,468 they would receive under a special separation benefit program. Of the 54 
captains the modal lump sum requested was $100,000 which was requested by 14 
captains. Another 15 captains requested a lump sum lower than $100,000 of which 12 
were lower than $78,468. Therefore, 53.7% of the captains in the survey indicated they 
would voluntarily separate from the military if a lump sum of $100,000 or less was 
offered. 
If Marine manpower planners were to implement new voluntary 
separation policies, the results would have yielded significant implications. The survey 
results suggested a voluntary separation offer that was similar to the special separation 
benefit which was too low to induce 47% of captains with 8 years of service to 
voluntarily separate. Since more than one-half of the captains indicated they were willing 
to accept $100,000 or less for voluntary separation, setting a separation bonus of 
$100,000 seemed reasonable. A separation bonus of $100,000 was commensurate with 
the Air Force’s 2010 voluntary separation policy. To meet target end strength goals, the 
Air Force offered officers in specific military occupational specialty with 6 to 14 years of 
service a voluntary separation bonus equivalent to two times separation pay (Schogol, 
2010, Air force wants to trim 5,750 people by 2012, para. 4). If the Marine Corps were to 
offer a similar separation policy, a captain with 8 years of service would receive a bonus 
of $104,624. 
The reservation values for captains in the survey were used to examine the 
potential savings to the Marine Corps when an officer chooses early separation and 
waives full retirement pay. On average, a captain in the survey requested a lump sum 
payment of $249,629. Based on the retirement pay streams calculated using the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense military compensation High-3 retirement calculator, substantial 
cost savings were achieved when an officer waived retirement pay. A captain with 8 
years of service who chose to accept a voluntary separation bonus of $249,629 waived 
over $2.4 million before taxes in retirement pay. Every captain who accepts early 
separation reduces future retirement cost to the Marine Corps by $2.4 million. Table 5 
depicts the estimated retirement pay an O-4 rank would receive.  
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Table 5.   Estimated Retirement Pay for an O-4 Retiring at 20 YOS 









1 2011 $3,431 $41,167 $41,167 $30,875 $30,875 
10 2020 $4,100 $49,198 $450,763 $36,898 $338,072 
20 2030 $4,998 $59,972 $1,000,240 $44,979 $750,180 
30 2040 $6,092 $73,105 $1,670,050 $54,829 $1,252,537 
40 2050 $7,426 $89,115 $2,486,544 $66,836 $1,864,908 
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense High-3 Calculator 
3. Personal Discount Rate 
Two questions from the survey were used to compute the personal discount rate 
for individuals in the sample. Participants were asked to identify the lump sum payment 
they would require for voluntary separation representing their present value of the offer. 
Participants were asked to identify an annuity payment they would accept for voluntary 
separation. They were asked to identify an annual payment for a period of time equaling 
two times his or her years of service they would accept for voluntary separation. The 
annuity payment represents their future value of the offer. Personal discount rates were 




Where future value is the annuity payment an officer would accept for voluntary 
separation. Present value is the lump sum an officer indicated he or she would accept for 
voluntary separation and Y is two times an officer’s current years of service. Only 82 
participants provided useable data to compute an officer’s personal discount rate. Table 6 















Average Years of Service 
(YOS) 
O-1 3 12% 0.04 2 yrs 4 months
O-2 17 18% 0.18 3 yrs 6 months
O-2E 3 7% 0.03 11 yrs 2 months
O-3 27 10% 0.09 8 yrs
O-3E 8 8% 0.12 15 yrs 6 months
O-4 18 5% 0.03 14 yrs 8 months
O-5 6 6% 0.02 20 yrs 4 months
Sample 82 10% 0.11 11 yrs 8 months
 
The results indicated the average discount rate for officers with less than 8 years 
of service was 13.3%. Officers with greater than 8 years of service had an average 
discount rate of 6.5%. If years of service is used as an indicator of age, the more years of 
service the older the individual, then the results were consistent with economic theory 
which suggested that younger individuals should discount income at a higher rate than 
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V. QUALITY SCORE DEVELOPMENT AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Developing a matrix that measures the quality attributes of an officer is 
problematic because of the difficulty in quantifying quality. Recognizing this challenge, 
the study attempted to quantify quality by developing a matrix based on the following 
criteria: Performance evaluations, command experience, time spent in primary military 
occupation specialty (PMOS), combat experience, physical fitness scores, combat fitness 
scores, level of education and second language proficiency. The survey asked questions 
pertaining to the aforementioned criteria. This study explores four options to establish a 
quality matrix. The development process of the quality matrix in each option was 
conducted in two steps.  
B. SCORING PROCESS 
The first step in the process is to develop a score for each assessment instrument 
used in the matrix. A score was assigned to each assessment instrument using a 3 or 4-
point Likert-type response option with a numeric value assigned to each response option. 
For example, one question asked respondents for their current physical fitness (PFT) 
score, and a numeric value was assigned to each response option as follows: 
Response Option  Response Value 
First Class    3.00 
Second Class    2.00 
Third Class    1.00 
Fail     0.00 
The scoring of the matrix assigned a weight for the assessment instruments and 
multiplies the weight by the response value to obtain a weighted value. As a second step 
in the process, the weighted values for the assessment instrument were added to obtain an 
overall weighted value score for each respondent. After aggregating the weighted value 
scores for each respondent, a quality score is then assigned; whereby, higher quality 
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officers will have higher quality scores. The quality score (q*) is characterized by two 
values: X and Y, representing the total number of possible points and the number of points 
scored by each respondent, respectively. A value of 5 is assigned to indicate the highest 




The process of assigning a weighted value for each assessment instrument used in each of 
the four options is described below. 
1. Option 1 
The first option computes a quality score based on four attributes that make a 
Marine Corps officer competitive for promotion. These attributes are: On the job 
performance, command and leadership experience, military occupational specialty 
credibility and physical fitness. In this option, different weights are assigned to each 
question. For example, more weight is given to the assessment instrument that evaluated 
a Marine’s overall performance. The remainder of this study will use the quality score 
results obtained from option 1. This option measures the quality attributes which are most 
likely to be used in evaluating officers for promotion and retention. 
a. Performance 
A precise indicator of a quality officer is the Marine Corps' performance 
evaluation system (PES). The evaluation system requires an officer’s immediate 
supervisor to evaluate his or her on the job performance using a fitness report. Coleman's 
(2010) commandant of the Marine Corps guidance on the performance evaluation system 
stated that: 
The completed fitness report is the most important information component 
in manpower management. It is the primary means of evaluating a 
Marine’s performance. The fitness report is the commandant’s primary 
tool available for selection of personnel for promotion, retention, 
augmentation, resident schooling, command, and duty assignment. 
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Therefore, the completion of this report is one of an officer’s most critical 
responsibilities… (Coleman, 2010, Significance of the Fitness Report, pp. 
1–4)  
The study used the relative value at the time of processing (RV@PROC) 
to assign a quality score for an officer’s performance. The relative value at the time of 
processing is a numeric value that reflects the relative value of a Marines’ fitness report 
at the time the report is processed based on the reporting senior's rating history for 
Marines of that same grade. The value is based on a numerical system of 80 to 100 with 
80 indicating the worst score, 100 indicating the best  score, and 90 indicating the 
average score for that reporting senior (Coleman, 2010, Appendix G, p. G-3). 
Since performance evaluations are the primary means of identifying a 
higher quality officer, more weight was given to this question. To compute a quality 
score using an officer's relative value at the time of processing, respondents were asked 
for the relative value at the time of processing of their last three observed fitness reports. 
An average relative value at the time of processing was computed for each respondent, 
and a numeric response value was assigned as follows: 
Average RV@PROC  Response Value 
80-85     1.00 
86-90     2.00 
91-95     3.00 
96-100     4.00 
This question was given a weight of 5 points. Therefore, a respondent with an average 
relative value of 92.5 would have a weighted value of 15 points (3 x 5). 
b. Command and Leadership Billets 
Another indicator of a quality officer is the number of command, staff and 
special duty assignments he or she has completed. Command experience is probably the 
most valuable experience officers can have to be more competitive amongst their peers 
and to demonstrate his or her value to the Marine Corps. To assign a quality score for 
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command and leadership experience, respondents were asked if they held any command 
and staff positions during their military career. The assessment instruments were given a 
weight of 4, and 3 points respectively, and a numeric response value was assigned as 
follows: 
Command Position  Staff Position   Response Value 
Yes    Yes    1.00 
No    No     0.00 
 
Any respondent who answered yes to having held a command position would have a 
weighted value of 4 points.  
Respondents were asked how many Joint Duty assignments they held 
throughout their military career. This assessment instrument was given a weight of two 
and respondents who indicated having held joint duty assignments were given a response 
value as follows: 
Response Option  Response Value 
0     0.00 
1     1.00 
2     2.00 
3 or more    3.00 
c. Time Spent in PMOS and Combat Experience 
All Marine officers are assigned a primary military occupational specialty 
(PMOS), and a military occupational specialty school prior to their first assignment in the 
fleet Marine force (FMF). The Marine Corps wants to have experienced and qualified 
officers serving in each military occupational specialty in an operational environment. 
The study used the amount of time an individual officer spent in his or her primary 
military occupational specialty and in the fleet Marine force, known as military 




assessment instruments asked respondents to state the years of service in their primary 
military occupational specialty. The question was given a weight of 4 and a numeric 
response value was assigned as follows: 
Response Option  Response Value 
0-2     1.00 
3-4     2.00 
5-6     3.00 
7 or more    4.00 
With the Commandant’s guidance that all Marines are provided the 
opportunity to deploy to a combat zone, the study used the number of combat 
deployments to compute the quality score for an individual officer. Having a combat 
deployment combined with military occupational specialty credibility demonstrates that 
an officer is fully trained and qualified to perform successfully in an operational and 
combat environment. These are the officers the Marine Corps wants to retain on active 
duty. Respondents were asked to identify the number of combat deployments they have 
completed in their military career and in their primary military occupational specialty. 
This assessment instrument was given a weight 3, and a numeric response value was 
assigned as follows: 
Response Option  Response Value 
0     0.00 
1-2     1.00 
3-4     2.00 
5 or more    3.00 
 
d. Physical Fitness 
Physical fitness is an integral part of Marine Corps’ training and 
performance on the battle field. As leaders, officers need to demonstrate high levels of 
physical fitness by achieving first class physical fitness (PFT) scores and combat fitness 
(CFT) scores. To compute a quality score based on physical fitness, respondents were 
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asked for their current physical fitness and combat fitness scores. The assessment 
instruments were given a weight of 1 point, and assigned a numeric response value as 
follows: 
Response Option  Response Value 
First Class    3.00 
Second Class    2.00 
Third Class    1.00 
Fail     0.00 
2. Options 2, 3 and 4 
To show differences in the scoring distribution of the quality matrix, it is 
necessary to look at alternative methods to develop a quality score. Option 1 uses 8 
assessment instruments and assigns different weights to each. In option 2, the quality 
score was computed using attributes similar to option 1: On the job performance, 
command and leadership experience, military occupational specialty credibility, and 
physical fitness. Option 2 assigned equal weight to each of the 8 assessment instruments.  
Option 3 reduced the number of assessment instruments and a quality score was 
developed based on performance and military occupational specialty credibility. Similar 
to Option 1 different weights were assigned to each assessment in Option 2. The fourth 
option increased the number of assessment instruments used in option 1 and assigned 
equal weights to each. Option 4 included level of education and language proficiency, as 
additional criteria that demonstrated a Marine officer’s value to the Marine Corps.  
3. Computed Quality Scores 
The overall quality scores were computed using Options 1 and 2 are illustrated 
below.  Respondent A's response to assessment instrument questions:  
Q1.  Under the Performance Evaluation Summary what was the “Relative Value at 
Processing” (RV at Proc) of last three fitness reports? Answer: 89, 93, 96.  
 Therefore RV@PROC= 92.7 
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Q2. In your military career have you held a command position where you held NJP 
authority? Answer: Yes 
Q3. In your military career have you held any staff positions, i.e. executive officer, 
operations officer?  Answer: Yes 
Q4. How many Joint Duty Assignments have you held in your military career? 
Answer: 2 
Q5. Years/months of service in primary MOS? Answer: 3 years 4 months 
Q6. How many combat deployments (6 months or more) have you completed in your 
primary MOS? Answer: 2 
Q7. What is your current PFT Score? Answer: First Class 
Q8. What is your current CFT Score? Answer: First Class 
Based on respondent A’s answers to the assessment instrument questions when 
different weights are assigned, this respondent would receive a quality score of 3.21 
points. Table 7 provides an example of how a quality score is computed for respondent A 
when different weights are assigned to the assessment instruments. 
Table 7.   Computed Quality Score When Different Weights are Assigned 
Question   Response           RV       x Weight   =  Weighted Value 
   Max 
Points(X)
Q1. 92.7          3 5 15 20 
Q2. Yes          1 4 4 4 
Q3. Yes          1 3 3 3 
Q4. 2          1 2 2 6 
Q5. 3yrs 4mths          2 4 8 16 
Q6. 2          1 3 3 9 
Q7. 1st Class          3 1 3 3 
Q8. 1st Class          3 1 3 3 
SUM                    Y = 41     X = 64 
 
      
 
When an equal weight is assigned to each assessment instrument, regardless of 
value, respondent A’s quality score increases to 3.41 points. Table 8 illustrates 
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respondent A’s quality score when a weight of 5 is assigned to each assessment 
instrument. The quality scores for Options 3 and 4 are computed in a similar manner. 
Table 8.   Computed Quality Score When Equal Weights are Assigned 
Question   Response           RV       x Weight   Weighted Value 
   Max 
Points(X)
Q1. 92.7          3 5 15 20 
Q2. Yes          1 5 5 5 
Q3. Yes          1 5 5 5 
Q4. 2          1 5 5 15 
Q5. 3yrs 4mths          2 5 10 20 
Q6. 2          1 5 5 15 
Q7. 1st Class          3 5 15 15 
Q8. 1st Class          3 5 15 15 





      
 
C. QUALITY SCORE RESULTS 
The quality score rating was developed based on the data from the survey. Four 
different options were explored in computing the quality score. The number of useable 
observations was limited by the development process of the quality score rating. The 
main assessment instrument used in each of the quality score options was the average 
relative value at the time of processing. Survey participants were asked to identify the 
relative value at the time of processing of their last three observed fitness reports. Of the 
127 participants who answered the question 86 were useable. One observation was 
deleted because his or her bid of $6 million was too high. This suggests that no amount of 
incentive would induce the respondent to accept voluntary separation. The remaining 40 
observations were deleted because incorrect information was provided. For example, 
several respondents entered not applicable (n/a), unknown, or their reporting officer’s 
ranking.  
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When applied to the sample, each option produced varying descriptive statistics. 
There was a strong positive correlation between the top one-third quality scores in each 
option. The correlation coefficients ranged from 0.93 and 0.97 indicating that the same 
individuals were selected in the top one-third of every option. A weak positive correlation 
(r = 0.15) was found between high-quality officers and the amount of compensation, 
reservation value he or she would be willing to accept for voluntary separation from the 
military. The result was consistent with prior assumptions that higher quality officers 
would have higher reservation values. A plot of the reservation values and quality scores 
in the data produces the following graph: 
 
Figure 2.   Plot of Reservation Value Vs. Quality Score 
The graph of reservation value and quality score confirms that the data is not 
perfectly linear (R2= 0.0113). The slope or rate of change of the trend line is 59.67, which 
implies that the average reservation value in the sample is increasing by approximately 
$60,000 with every one point increase in quality score. 
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When the results from the first option were applied to the sample, the mean 
quality score was 3.11 points, modal quality score was 3.13 points, standard deviation 
was 0.68, and minimum and maximum quality scores were 1.64 points and 4.61 points, 
respectively. In the second option, the mean quality score increased to 3.22 points, modal 
quality score increased to 3.18 points with a standard deviation of 0.51, and the sample 
had a minimum and maximum quality score of 2.27 points and 4.55 points, respectively. 
In the third option, the mean quality score was 3.32 points, the modal quality score was 
3.44 points, the standard deviation was 0.80, and the minimum and maximum quality 
scores were 1.33 points and 5.00 points, respectively. In the fourth option, the mean 
quality score was 3.02 points, the modal quality score was 3.00 points, the standard 
deviation was 0.58, and the minimum and maximum quality scores were 2.00 points and 
3.02 points, respectively. Table 9 shows the correlation between the top 1/3 quality scores 
from each of the four options. 
Table 9.   Correlation Between the Top 1/3 Quality Scores 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
Option 1 1 0.96 0.95 0.97 
Option 2 0.96 1 0.92 0.95 
Option 3 0.95 0.96 1 0.93 
Option 4 0.97 0.95 0.93 1 
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VI. AUCTION SIMULATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Once the quality score matrix was developed the next step was to apply the 
quality scores to a quality adjusted discount model. The objective of using the model was 
to determine if the Marine Corps can increase the overall quality of officers retained 
while reducing the total amount of voluntary separation bonuses paid to departing 
officers. To do so, quality gains and cost savings were evaluated by comparing the results 
from a standard uniform price auction to those achieved from a uniform price quality 
adjusted discount auction. The results from the survey provided the data to conduct 
several auction simulation runs using an Excel model. The survey provided the bidders 
and their reservation values for separating from active duty. The key variables and 
definitions used in each separation model were similar to those in the retention auction 
used by White (2010).  
1. Definition of Terms 
Reservation value or bid: Survey respondents were asked how much 
compensation or lump sum payment, he or she would accept to voluntarily separate from 
the military. The amounts were used as the reservation values for officers in the model. 
Quality rating: Each officer in the model received a quality score ranging from 1 
to 5 points. 
q*: The quality rating identifies the higher quality officers. Officers with quality 
scores greater than or equal to q* are higher quality officers and qualify for the quality 
adjusted discount. 
$A: The Department of Defense authorized allowance given to officers with 
quality scores greater or equal to q*. 
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Quality adjusted discount bid: To arrive at a quality adjusted bid, the Department 
of Defense authorized allowance ($A) is added to the initial bids submitted by officers 
possessing a quality score greater or equal to q*.   
Rank: Indicates the standing of each bidder after computing quality adjusted 
discount bids and ranks them from highest to lowest.  
Bonus received: In the quality adjusted discount auction, officers with the lowest 
quality adjusted bids  the winners and will receive a bonus equal to the first excluded.  
Target: The number of officers the Marine Corps wants to separate in order to 
meet end strength goals.  
B. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND RESULTS 
To conduct the uniform price and the quality adjusted discount auction for 
separation simulations, the evaluation variables and design characteristics were entered 
into an Excel model. The following assumptions were made: 
 The 86 respondents represent Marine officers in a specific MOS and they 
volunteer to participate in a separation auction. 
 Each model assumes different targeted separation goals. The Marine 
Corps will separate 73, 56 and 43 of the 86 officers who choose to 
participate in the auction. 
 Auction bids are the lump sum payment (reservation value) each officer 
requested for voluntary separation. The bids range from $5,000 to $2 
million. 
1. Standard Uniform Price Auction Simulations 
To simulate the uniform price auctions, the auctions will assume the goal is to 
separate 43, 56 and 73 out of 86 officers in a given MOS. If the goal is to separate 43 




bonuses to the 43 officers with the lowest reservation value for separation. The 43 
officers who submit the lowest bids are the winners but would receive a bonus equivalent 
to the forty-forth bid or first excluded bid.  
Based on the aforementioned example using a uniform price auction to separate 
43 officers, it would cost the Marine Corps $5.5 million. A similar model is run for target 
separation goals of 56 and 73. As expected, the target separation goals increased total 
cost. Table 10 compares the cost and average quality officers retained using the different 
target separation goals. 
Table 10.   Separation Cost and Average Quality Using a Uniform Price Auction 
Target Separation=73 Target Separation=56 Target Separation=43 
Total Cost= $76,000,000 Total Cost= $13,725,000 Total Cost= $5,520,000 
Avg. Quality = 3.16 Avg. Quality = 3.16 Avg. Quality = 3.24 
Bonus Paid = $1,041,095 Bonus Paid = $245,089 Bonus Paid = $128,372 
 
2. QUAD Auction Simulations 
The quality adjusted discount simulations used the same target separation goals 
and assumptions as above. A monetary allowance of $A was allocated to the bids of all 
officers with a quality rating greater or equal to q*. Each simulation assumed the Marine 
Corps was authorized to give an allowance of $A based on 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% of 
the average reservation values or bids previously used. The quality adjusted discount 
simulations assumed that officers must possess a q* rating greater than or equal to 3.43 to 
qualify for the allowance. The quality rating represents the cut off quality score for the 
top one-third high-quality officer in the sample. An officer was allocated an allowance 
only if his or her quality score was equal to or exceeded 3.43. His or her quality adjusted 
bid was then computed by adding $A to their initial bid. Table 11 compares the cost to the 
Marine Corps an average quality officer retained using a quality adjusted discount 
auction that incorporates q* = 3.43, $A = $70,000, $140,000, $212,500, $284,000 and 
target separation goals of 43, 56, and 73. 
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Table 11.   Separation Cost and Average Quality Gains Using a QUAD Auction 
$A Target Separation= 43 Target Separation= 56 Target Separation = 73 
Cost= $5,520,000 Cost= $13,725,000 Cost= $76,000,000 
Avg. Quality = 3.24 Avg. Quality = 3.16 Avg. Quality = 3.16 
$0  Bonus Paid = $128,372 Bonus Paid = $245,089 Bonus Paid = $1,041,095 
Cost= $8,330,000 Cost= $11,790,000 Cost= $40,000,000 
Avg. Quality = 3.28 Avg. Quality = 3.25 Avg. Quality = 3.34 
$70,000  Bonus Paid = $193,720 Bonus Paid = $205,357 Bonus Paid = $547,945 
Cost= $8,610,000 Cost= $12,600,000 Cost= $43,5000,000 
Avg. Quality = 3.48 Avg. Quality = 3.36 Avg. Quality = 3.34 
$140,000  Bonus Paid = $200,232 Bonus Paid = $225,000 Bonus Paid = $595,890 
Cost= $11,075,000 Cost= $15,977,500 Cost= $47,125,000 
Avg. Quality = 3.53 Avg. Quality = 3.38 Avg. Quality = 3.34 
$212,500  Bonus Paid = $257,558 Bonus Paid = $285,312 Bonus Paid = $645,547 
Cost= $11,287,000 Cost= $19,052,000 Cost= $50,700,000 
Avg. Quality = 3.55 Avg. Quality = 3.38 Avg. Quality = 3.34 
$284,000  Bonus Paid = $262,500 Bonus Paid = $340,214 Bonus Paid = $694,520 
 
Table 10 illustrates that offering increases in $A ranging from $70,000 to 
$284,000 weakly increased the average quality of officers retained. For example, when 
the target separation goal is 56, increasing $A from $70,000 to $140,000 increased 
average quality by 0.11 points. However, increases in $A greater than $140,000 resulted 
in no further increases in average quality. Additionally, offering increases in $A 
increased total cost. For instance, when the target separation goal is 43, increasing $A 
from $70,000 to $140,000, total increased cost by $280,000. Thus, as the QUAD 
allowance increases, the QUAD model retains higher quality officers at a greater cost. 
a. Increasing the Target Separation Goal 
Increasing size of the target separation goal increased total separation cost. 
This is expected since more officers are being separated, and they are separated at a 
higher bonus. In almost every simulation, when the target separation goal is increased the 
average quality officer retained decreased. Such may be the case since some of the higher 
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quality officers who were retained at lower separation rates are now being separated 
when separation rates are higher. However, increasing the separation target from 56 to 73 
and applying a QUAD of $70,000, the average quality officer retained increased from 
3.25 to 3.34. This was the only simulation that produced quality gains when the target 
separation goal is increased. 
b. Changing the Quality Rating (q*) 
The predetermined quality rating affects the total cost and quality gains 
using the uniform price QUAD auction. The results from a target separation goal of 56, 
q* = 3.43, and $A values discussed above are used as a baseline to compare the cost and 
quality gains if q* is either increased or decreased. Increasing the predetermined quality 
rating (q*) from 3.43 to 3.74 increased the overall total cost when $A is increased 
incrementally. However, the average quality officer retained reduced weakly. For 
instance, increasing q* from 3.43 to 3.74 when $A is $70,000, average quality increased 
by .02 points. However, increasing $A above $70,000 decreased average quality. 
On the other hand, decreasing the quality rating from 3.43 to 3.11 
decreased the quality of officer retained. However, the total cost varied depending on the 
value of $A applied. For instance, when an $A of $70,000 or $284,000 is applied, total 
cost decreased. Conversely, when an $A of $140,000 or $212,500 is applied, total cost 
increased. Table 12 illustrates the changes is cost and average quality when q* is either 








Table 12.   Changes in Cost and Average Quality When q* = 3.11 and 3.74     
(Target Separation Goal = 56) 
$A q*= 3.11(Top 1/2) q*= 3.43 (Top 1/3) q* = 3.74 (Top 1/4) 
Cost= $11,270,000 Cost= $11,790,000 Cost= $11,770,000 
Avg. Quality = 3.25 Avg. Quality = 3.26 Avg. Quality = 3.28 
$70,000  Bonus Paid = $201,250 Bonus Paid = $205,357 Bonus Paid = $210,178 
Cost= $13,880,000 Cost= $12,600,000 Cost= $12,850,000 
Avg. Quality = 3.27 Avg. Quality = 3.36 Avg. Quality = 3.32 
$140,000  Bonus Paid = $247,857 Bonus Paid = $225,000 Bonus Paid = $229,464 
Cost= $16,137,500 Cost= $15,977,500 Cost= $17,492,500 
Avg. Quality = 3.30 Avg. Quality = 3.38 Avg. Quality = 3.36 
$212,500  Bonus Paid = $288,169 Bonus Paid = $285,312 Bonus Paid = $312,366 
Cost= $19,220,000 Cost= $19,052,000 Cost= $20,996,000 
Avg. Quality = 3.30 Avg. Quality = 3.38 Avg. Quality = 3.36 
$284,000  Bonus Paid = $343,214 Bonus Paid = $340,214 Bonus Paid = $374,928 
 
The results of the auction simulations allow Marine Corps Manpower 
Planners to be flexible when trying to allocate funds for voluntary separation. The QUAD 
auction allows planners to set a precise bonus amount to attain specific target separation 
goals, depending on a separation budget. Assuming the separation budget for officers is 
set at $13 million, retaining the top 1/3 officers with q* ≥ 3.43 and an $A of $140,000 
yields the highest quality gains, but at the highest cost. However, quality gains at $A of 
$140,000 are only 0.1 more than the average quality achieved when $A is $70,000 for the 
same value of q*.Therefore, it would cost $810,000 to achieve a 0.1 point increase in 
average quality. Having a quality score increase of 0.1 is equivalent to having an 
additional Joint Duty assignment. Based on the quality matrix, an officer with one 
additional Joint Duty Assignment increases his/her quality score by 0.1 points. Thus, 
there is a tradeoff between cost and quality.  
Although the bids and the value of $A remained unchanged in all 
simulations, the results were not consistent. The inconsistencies that occurred by 
increasing the target separation goal and by changing the predetermined quality rating 
may be a result of the weak correlation between high-quality officers and his or her 
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reservation values. If there was a strong positive correlation, one may expect average 
quality to always increase depending on the value of $A, the actual bid amounts, and the 
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VII. MULTIVARIATE MODELS AND RESULTS 
A. DATA SET AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Using the data collected from the survey, this study examined the personal, 
professional and economic factors that have a significant effect on a Marine officer’s 
decision to participate in a voluntary separation program. The data retrieved from the 
survey contained 205 observations. Of the 205 observations, 10 were dropped because of 
missing values. It was expected that the probability of an officer who chose to participate 
in a voluntary separation program was a function of gender, race, marital status, number 
of dependents, pay grade, education level, years of service, military occupational 
specialty, expected civilian earnings and personal discount rate. Responses from the 
survey provided information for the variables. Table 13 shows an overview of the 
variables and their definitions.  
Table 13.   Variables From the Voluntary Separation Survey 
Variable                                                          Variable Definition 
VSIP_Part 
1= yes to participating in a voluntary separation program; 0 
otherwise 
 
Gender 1= Female; 2= Male 
 
Race 1= Asian 
 2=Black/African American 
 3=Other 
 4=Spanish/Hispanic Descent 
 5= White 
 
Marital Status 1= Divorced 
 2= Married 
 3= Single 
 Number of non-spouse dependents 
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Number of Dependents 
 1= 0 dependents 
 2= 1-2 dependents 
 
3 = 3 or more dependents 
 
Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS) 1= Aviation (pilots fixed or rotary wing) 
 2= Aviation Support 
 3= Combat Arms 
 4= Combat Service Support 
 
Education 1= Bachelor's 
 2= Master's 
 3= Doctorate 
 
Pay Grade 1= O-1 
 2=O-1E 
 3= O-2 
 4= O-2E 
 5= O-3 
 6= O-3E 
 7= O-4 
 8= O-5 
 9=O-6 
 
Years of Service (YOS) 
 
1= 1-3 
 2= 4-10 
 3= 11-15 
 4=16-22 
 5=23 and above 
  
Personal Discount Rate 
(PDR) Rate at which Officers trade current dollars for future dollars
 
Quality Score 
A 1-5 scale ranking of Marine officers based on quality 
attributes 
 
Expected Civilian Pay 
Annual pay a Marine expects to receive in the civilian labor 
market 
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B. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Given the specific variables collected from the survey, the base empirical model 
used to estimate the probability of an officer’s choice about whether or not to participate 
in voluntary separation program was: 
VSIP_Part = β0 Female  +  β2Minority  +  β3num_deps  +  β4O1 +  β5O2  + 
β602E + β7O3 + β8O3E + β9Aviators + β10Aviaition_Support + β11 
CombatSvc_Support  +  β12Bachelors  +  β13Masters  +  β14Married  + 
β15YOS  +  β16 Expected_Civ_Pay 
 
A second equation was estimated using the same variables as the base model that 
included variables that controlled for an individual’s discount rate and quality score. A 
separate model was estimated with these variables because only 82 observations from the 
previous model provided information necessary to compute a personal discount rate and 
quality score. 
The equations were estimated using probit regression to analyze the marginal 
probability associated with each explanatory variable. In this model, the marginal 
probability was the change in the probability of participating in a voluntary separation 
program associated with a one-unit change in a specific independent variable; ceteris 
paribus .A probit regression was used because the dependent variable is binary and it 
solved the problem of heteroskedasticity by using the maximum likelihood estimation 
(Wooldridge, 2008). Stata an econometric software package was used to perform the 
regression.  
C. HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable VSIP_Part was constructed from an assessment 
instruments in the survey. Respondents were asked if a voluntary separation incentive 
were offered, how likely they would take advantage of such a program. Responses were 
 56
limited to: (a) very likely, (b) likely, (c) not sure, (d) unlikely and (e) very unlikely. 
VSIP_Part was coded 1, if the respondent replied very likely and likely, and coded 0 if 
he/she said not sure, unlikely and very unlikely to participating in a voluntary separation 
incentive program. 
2. Independent Variables 
Several factors should effect an individual’s decision to participate in a voluntary 
separation incentive program. The following describes the variables used in the study and 
their hypothesized effect on an individual’s likelihood to participate in voluntary 
separation program.   
(1) Gender: To control for gender specific differences in voluntary separation 
participation behavior a dummy variable was constructed for gender. These differences 
may not be observable because of the small number of female observations in the sample. 
However, it is expected that female officers would be less likely to participate in a 
separation program because of lower civilian earnings. Survey participants were asked to 
self-identify as either male or female. 
(2) Race/Ethnicity: In an effort to control for racial and ethnic differences in an 
individual’s participation behavior a race-ethnic variable was included in the model. The 
survey asked participants to identify the racial category to which they belong from the 
following choices: white, black/African American, Spanish/Hispanic descent, Native 
American/Eskimo, Asian and other. For analytic purposes, the last five categories were 
collapsed into a minority category and then converted to a dummy variable. The category 
white is excluded from the model.  It is expected that minorities will potentially have 
lower civilian earnings, and minority officers will be more likely to stay on active duty. It 
is expected that minority officers will be less likely to participate in a voluntary 
separation program. 
(3) Number of Dependents: Prior research postulates that as the number of 
dependents in a service member’s family increases, the more likely he/she will be to 
remain on active duty. Therefore, the number of dependents is expected to lower the 
probability of an officer participating in a voluntary separation program. 
 57
(4) Marital Status: Compared to single service-members, married service-
members tend to remain on active duty rather than separate.  Medical health plans, BAH 
allowances and other non-pecuniary benefits offered by the military increase a married 
service members’ opportunity cost of separating. An officer’s marital status is expected 
to have a negative influence on his or her decision to participate in a voluntary separation 
program.   
(5) Pay Grade and years of service: As an officer’s rank and years of service 
increase, it was expected that he or she would be less likely to participate in a voluntary 
separation program. Officers in higher pay grades and with more years of service have a 
vested interest in the military’s retirement system. They would be more inclined to 
complete 20 or more years of service to collect retirement pay and other non-pecuniary 
retirement benefits. 
(6) Education: The impact of increased education, such as master’s and doctorate 
degree, on an officer’s decision to participate in a voluntary separation program is 
unclear. One hypothesis is that officers with education levels higher than a bachelor’s 
degree could believe they are not being properly compensated for their higher education 
level in the Marine Corps and may expect to find a higher paying job in the civilian 
market. In this case, officers will be more likely to participate in voluntary separation 
program as education increases. The counter to the aforementioned hypothesis is that 
officers could view having a graduate education as increasing his or her probability of 
promotion and value to the Marine Corps. In this case, officers would be less likely to 
participate in a voluntary separation program as education increases. The Marine Corps 
would hope that the latter case is prevalent if a voluntary separation program was 
implemented.  
The survey asked participants to identify the highest educational degree attained 
from the following responses: associates degree, bachelors’ degree, masters’ degree and  
doctoral degree. There were no respondents with less than a bachelor’s degree. For 
analyses, the categories were transformed into dummy variables with doctorate as the 
excluded category. 
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(7) Military occupational specialty: It is expected that military occupational 
specialty will have both a negative and positive influence on an officer’s decision to 
participate in a voluntary separation program. For instance, aviators are expected to have 
a lower probability of participating in a voluntary separation program. On average, 
Marine aviators receive more pay compared to officers in other military occupational 
specialties. In addition to basic pay and allowances, these officers receive special annual 
bonuses; as high as $25,000, to remain on active duty. Conversely, it expected that 
officers serving in combat and service support communities would have a higher 
probability of participating in a voluntary separation program. 
The survey asked participants to identify their primary military occupational 
specialty. For analysis, each response was categorized as aviation, aviation support, 
combat arms and combat service support. Dummy variables were generated for each 
category with combat arms military occupational specialty as the excluded category. 
(8) Expected civilian pay. If an officer’s expected civilian earnings is greater that 
his or her current military pay, the officer will be more likely to separate; it was 
anticipated that expected civilian labor earning will have a positive influence on an 
officer’s decision to participate in a separation program. If expected, civilian earnings are 
less than current military pay, the probability of participation decreases.  To get the data 
for expected civilian pay, the survey asked participants to identity the annual income they 
would expect in the civilian labor market. 
(9) Discount rate. It is expected that an officer’s discount rate will have a positive 
effect on the probability of an officer participating in a voluntary separation program.  
D. RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE MODELS 
This section discusses and interprets the results of the empirical analysis. 
Subsections 1 and 2 present and discuss the findings on the effect of personal, 
professional and economic characteristics on the voluntary separation behavior of Marine 
officers. To estimate these effects, multivariate probit models are estimated to determine 
the direction and the magnitude of the variables discussed in Chapter IV.  
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Subsection 3 presents and discusses the results of ordinary least squares models 
(OLS) used to estimate the effects of personal, professional and economic factors on the 
amount of lump sum payment an officer would accept for voluntary separation. A second 
OLS model is estimated to determine the effects of similar factors on an officer quality score 
rating. 
1. Voluntary Separation Estimation Results 
Table 14 displays the estimation results for the likelihood of an officer 
participating in a voluntary separation program: 
Table 14.   Voluntary Separation Estimation Results 
Variable   
Parameter  
Estimate   
Standard 
Error   Pr>|Z|   
Partial 
Effects
Female  -0.5797  0.1426  0.2030  -0.2087
Minority  0.1250  0.0970  0.6090  0.0494
num_deps  -0.5767  0.1833  0.2150  -0.2270
O1  0.2954  0.2399  0.6260  0.1174
O2  0.2163  0.1539  0.5760  0.0858
O2E  -0.0185  0.2311  0.9750  -0.0073
O3  0.7262  0.1261  0.03101  0.2835
O3E  0.2731  0.1357  0.4250  0.1084
Aviators  0.0148  0.1118  0.9580  0.0058
Aviation_Support  0.1686  0.1794  0.7080  0.0669
CombatSvc_Support  0.4543  0.0969  0.06902  0.1784
Bachelors  -0.9840  0.2534  0.18303  -0.3757
Masters  -0.7209  0.2428  0.3330  -0.2635
Married  -0.1680  0.1547  0.6750  0.0656
YOS  -0.0404  0.0276  0.5650  -0.0159
Expected_Civ_Pay  0.0413  0.0093  0.08202  0.0163
R-Squared  0.0809       
Observations   190             
1 Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. 
2 Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level. 
2 Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level of a 1 tail test. 
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The probit model accounted for approximately 8% of the variation in the 
dependent variable. The partial effect coefficients explained the likelihood of 
participation would change based on a one unit change in the independent variables. Most 
of the partial effect coefficients were as expected although not significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. The partial effects results indicate that the probability of a 
female officer participating in a voluntary separation program was lower compared to 
their male counterparts. Females were .2087 less likely to participate in a voluntary 
separation program. The coefficient of female was statistically insignificant. Although 
insignificant, these results were expected.  
Female officers are less likely to participate because their wages in the civilian 
labor market are likely to be lower than male officers (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003). 
Therefore, if they chose to participate and leave the military they could expect to earn 
less in the civilian labor market than their male counterparts. 
Being a minority had an insignificant positive effect on a Marine officer’s 
probability of participating in voluntary separation program. Minority officers were 
0.0494 more likely to participate in voluntary separation program than white officers. 
This finding was unexpected. It was thought that since civilian earnings are greater for 
whites than minorities, there would be a lower propensity for minorities to participate in a 
voluntary separation program. These results contradict existing evidence that minorities 
are on average, less likely to voluntary separate (Mehay & Hogan, 1995). 
The partial effects revealed that the number of dependents had a negative effect 
on the probability of an officer participating in a voluntary separation program. Officers 
who added one more dependent were 0.2271 less likely to participate in a voluntary 
separation program. While the effect of one more dependent was negative, the coefficient 
was not statistically significant. The effect, although insignificant, was anticipated. The 
decreased participation associated with having another dependent may be explained 
through the increased need for benefits offered by the military. 
A Marine’s pay grade had differing effect on the probability of an officer 
participating in a voluntary separation program. Officers in pay grades O-1, O-2, O-3 and 
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O-3E had a positive effect on participation. Compared to field grades, officers in lower 
pay grades were 0.1174, 0.0857, 0.2834 and 0.1083 more likely to participate in a 
voluntary separation program, respectively. The effect of officers in pay grade O-2E was 
negative. Compared to field grades, officers in pay grade O-2E officers were 0.0072 less 
likely to participate in a voluntary separation program, the reason is unclear. The 
coefficient of O-2E was also significant at the 0.05 level. With the exception of O-2E, 
these results are consistent with existing evidence that service members in higher pay 
grades are less likely to voluntarily separate (Mehay & Hogan, 1995). It was expected 
that field grade officers would be less likely to participate. Field grade officers are closer 
to or at retirement and would, therefore, waive retirement pay if they choose to 
participate in a voluntary separation program. 
The effects of having an aviation, aviation support, and combat service support 
military occupational specialty were anticipated. Compared to officers in the combat 
arms military occupational specialty, officers in aviation, aviation support, and combat 
service support military occupational specialties were more likely to participate in 
voluntary separation program. The partial effects were 0.0058, 0.0669, and 0.1784, 
respectively. While the coefficient of combat service support military occupational 
specialty was significant, the results suggested that noncombat arms military 
occupational specialty were more likely to participate in a voluntary separation program. 
The results were expected for officers in aviation support and combat support military 
occupational specialties, since these officers have obtained training and education in jobs 
that are transferable to the civilian labor market. The result for aviation was not 
anticipated. It was expected that officers in aviation military occupational specialty would 
be less likely to participate because of the incentive pay they receive for remaining on 
active duty. 
The hypothesized effects of having a bachelor’s or master’s degree were unclear. 
The partial effects revealed that compared to the base group, doctorate degree, the effects 
of having a bachelor’s and master’s degree were negative, 0.3756 and 0.2634 
respectively. While only the coefficient of bachelors was significant at the 10% level of a 
one tail test, the results reveal that officers with less than a doctorate degree are less 
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likely to participate in a voluntary separation program. These results suggest that officers 
with doctorate degrees may feel more confident about long term job opportunities in the 
civilian labor market. Or, officers with doctorate degrees may feel that they are not being 
compensated for their higher education levels and may expect to find a higher paying job 
in the civilian labor market. 
Marital status and had an insignificant negative effect on a Marine officer’s 
probability of participating in a voluntary separations program. The partial effects of 
marital status show that married officers were 0.065 less likely to participate in voluntary 
separation program. These results were expected, and may be explained by the fact that 
military allowances and benefits are greater for those with dependents.   
Years of service had a negative effect on the probability of an officer who chose 
to participate in a voluntary separation program. Although insignificant, the effect of one 
more year of service was negative 0.0159. This result was expected. As an officer’s time 
in service increases, he or she grows closer to being retirement eligible. This fact then 
should make it less advantageous for officers with more years of service to participate in 
a voluntary separation program. Doing so would entail forfeiting retirement pay and non-
pecuniary benefits. 
 As anticipated, the effect of a one unit increase in expected civilian earnings on 
the probability of participating in a voluntary separation program was significant and 
positive. The partial effect indicates that as expected civilian pay increases, the 
probability of participation in a voluntary separation program was 0.0162.  
2. Voluntary Separation Estimation (Personal Discount Rate) 
This section presents the results of the probit model that included personal 





Table 15.   Voluntary Separation Estimation Results (With Discount Rate) 
Variable   
Parameter 
Estimates   
Standard 
Error   Pr>|Z|   
Partial 
Effects
Expected_Civ_Pay  0.0370  0.0118  0.4580  0.0088
Discount_rate  0.0636  0.0051  0.00311  0.0151
Quality_score  0.2959  0.0854  0.4110  0.0702
Married  -0.6257  0.1439  0.18722  -0.1719
Minority  0.1256  0.1275  0.8020  0.031
O2  0.5828  0.2558  0.4940  0.1577
O3  0.5828  0.1664  0.3810  0.1432
Bachelors  -0.5598  0.2042  0.3910  -0.1561
Aviation  0.8230  0.1757  0.13322  0.2345
Aviation_Support  0.6201  0.291  0.4490  0.1868
Combat_Arms  -0.2025  0.1264  0.7250  -0.0462
YOS  -0.1093  0.0375  0.4940  -0.0259
Pseudo R2       0.2034       
Observations   82             
1 Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. 
2 Coefficient is significant at 0.10 level of a one tail test. 
The model accounted for approximately 20.4% of the variation in the dependent 
variable. The partial effect coefficients explained the likelihood of participation that 
would change based on a one unit change in the independent variables. The partial effects 
of minority, pay grade, education, MOS, expected civilian pay and YOS variables all had 
similar effects on the probability of participation as the model above. The partial effects 
of marital status changed in this model. Marital status had a significant effect, at 0.10 
level of a one tail test, on a Marine officer’s probability of participating in voluntary 
separation program. The partial effect of marital status shows that married officers were 
0.1719 less likely to participate in a voluntary separation program. Unlike the previous 
model, which revealed married to have a positive effect on participation, these results 
were anticipated. 
The effects of personal discount rate (PDR) determined by this study revealed that 
a one percent increase in the PDR increases the probability of an officer participating in a 
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voluntary separation program by 1.5%. The partial effect of PDR was 0.0151 and proved 
to be significant at the 0.05 level, holding all else constant. This implies that officers who 
place more value in current dollars (lump sum) over future dollars (retirement pay) have 
higher discount rates and are, therefore, more likely to participate in a voluntary 
separation program. 
Quality score had a positive effect on the probability of an officer choosing to 
participate in a voluntary separation program. Although insignificant, the effect of a one 
unit increase in quality score was 0.0702. This result suggests that higher quality officers 
were more likely to participate in a voluntary separation program. 
3. Ordinary Least Squares Estimation Results 
a. Quality Score Estimations 
This section presents the results of the ordinary least squares model that 
estimated the effects of personal and professional characteristics on the computed quality 
score of officers in the sample. Table 16 displays the estimation results. 
Table 16.   Quality Score Estimation Results 
Variable   
Parameter 
Estimates   
Standard 
Error   P-Value 
Aviation  -0.4992  0.1746  0.00601 
Aviation_Support  -0.0983  0.2847  0.7310 
CombatSvc_Support  -0.2857  0.1540  0.06802 
Minority  0.2514  0.1593  0.11903 
O2  -0.9690  0.1971  0.00001 
O3  -0.5385  0.1911  0.00601 
Bachelors  -0.0886  0.1854  0.6340 
YOS  0.0163  0.0515  0.7530 
discountrate  -0.0110  0.0069  0.11303 
R-Square  0.4988     
Observations   82         
1 Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
2 Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level. 
3 Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level of a one tail test. 
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The model accounted for approximately 49 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable. Each estimated coefficient explained how much an officer’s quality 
score would change based on a one unit change in the independent variable. The 
parameter estimates of the MOS variables were generally expected. Compared to the base 
category, combat arms MOS, officers in noncombat MOS had lower quality scores. 
However, the coefficient of aviation support MOS was statistically insignificant.  
Minority variable was significant and had a positive impact on quality 
score. The coefficient of the minority variable was 0.2514. This coefficient can be 
interpreted as being a minority officer will increase quality score by 0.2514 points, 
holding all other variables constant. The positive coefficient for minorities suggests that 
minority officers in the sample had higher quality scores compared to white officers.  
The parameter estimates of pay grade were significant and had a negative 
effect on quality scores. These effects were anticipated. Compared to the base group, 
field grade officers, both O-2 and O-3 pay grades were negative, 0.9690 and 0.5385, 
respectively. The results reveal that holding all else constant officers in pay grades O-2 
and O-3 will decrease quality score by 0.9690 and .05385 points respectively. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that field grade officers in the sample had higher quality 
scores. 
The coefficient of the education variable was negative and insignificant. 
The parameter estimate of education variable was negative 0.0886. This result shows that 
having a bachelor’s degree decreased quality score by 0.0886 points, holding all other 
factors constant. This infers that officers with an education level greater than a bachelor’s 
degree had higher quality scores.  
b. Personal Discount Rate Estimations 
The results of the ordinary least squares model that estimated the effects 
on personal discount rate are presented in Table 17. 
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Table 17.   Personal Discount Rate Estimation Results 
Variable   
Parameter 
Estimates   
Standard 
Error  P-Value 
Aviation  -5.0278  2.6919  0.06602 
Aviation_Support  -4.9676  4.7324  0.2970 
CombatSvc_Support  -3.3469  2.4408  0.17403 
YOS  -1.2821  1.2164  0.2950 
Married  2.1572  2.4740  0.3860 
qualityscore  -3.9188  1.6803  0.02201 
R-Squared  0.1401     
Observations   82        
      1 Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
2 Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level. 
3 Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level of a one tail test. 
 
The model accounted for approximately 14 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable. Each estimated coefficient explained how much an officer’s personal 
discount rate would change based on a one unit change in the independent variable. The 
parameter estimates of the military occupational specialty variables were generally 
expected. Compared to the base category, combat arms military occupational specialty, 
officers in non combat military occupational specialty had lower discount rates. The 
coefficients of aviation and combat service support military occupational specialty were 
significant. The results suggest that officers in combat arms military occupational 
specialty are less patient. They would rather receive an immediate pay off even thought 
the amount received is less compared to a future pay off. 
The coefficient of quality score was negative and significant. The results 
indicate that as quality score increases personal discount rate decreases by 3.9 percent. 
Officers with higher quality scores are more patient and would rather wait to receive a 
future pay off rather than receive an immediate pay off. This implies that higher quality 
officers place more value in future dollars. 
Years of service had negative but insignificant effect on personal discount 
rates. The coefficient can be interpreted as an additional increase in years of service 
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decreases personal discount rate by 1.2 percent. Officers with more years of service have 
lower discount rates. If years of service is used as an indicator of age, the more years of 
service the older the individual, then the results were consistent with economic theory 
which suggested that younger individuals discount income at a higher rate than older 
individuals (Mankiw, 2004). 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Findings of the probit models used in the study indicate that expected civilian pay, 
personal discount rate, marital status, certain Marine occupational specialties (MOS) and 
officers in the O-3 pay grade had a significant effect on the probability of a Marine 
officer participating in a voluntary separation program. Some of the results are consistent 
with the findings reported by Mehay and Hogan (1995) who analyzed the factors 
affecting the voluntary separation behavior of Navy enlisted personnel in FY92. The 
ordinary least squares model used to estimate the effects on an officer’s quality score 
rating indicated that MOS, race and pay grade had significant effects. The results of the 
personal discount rate ordinary least squares model indicated that quality score, and 
aviation and combat service support military occupational specialties had a negative and 
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The objective of the study was to determine the feasibility of the Marine Corps 
using a uniform price quality adjusted auction to assign voluntary separation bonuses and 
retain higher quality officers. The second objective was to identify the effects of personal, 
professional, and economic factors on a Marine officer’s decision to participate in a 
voluntary separation program. To collect the necessary data needed to address these 
objectives, a survey was designed and administered to approximately five hundred 
unrestricted Marine officers assigned to I Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, Naval 
Postgraduate School, and Defense Language Institute. The survey provided data used to: 
(a) compute a quality score rating for use in quality adjusted discount auction 
simulations, (b) determine an officer’s reservation value for separating from the military 
reflected by the minimum amount of lump sum pay he or she would accept for voluntary 
separation, and (c) gather data to conduct empirical analysis. 
The methodology used to conduct quality adjusted discount simulations closely 
followed that used by White (2010), but focused on a separation application, rather than 
retention. Unlike White's (2010) study, which used randomly generated data, the survey 
results provided actual data to conduct all simulations. Multivariate probity and ordinary 
least squares models were estimated to derive the effect of personal, professional, and 
economic traits on the decision to participate in a voluntary separation program. The 
probability of participating in a voluntary separation program was estimated to be a 
function of the following traits: gender, race, military occupational specialty, pay grade, 
marital status, level of education, years of service, expected civilian earnings, personal 
discount rate, and number of dependents. 
The results obtained from the survey analysis, auction simulations, and 
multivariate regressions could provide Marine Corps manpower planners with qualitative 
and quantitative information. The information could be used to assist with decisions 
regarding the expected downsizing of the Marine Corps' force structure.  
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
The study explored prior auction research that evaluated the efficiency and cost 
savings that may be achieved by using a quality adjusted auction for assigning voluntary 
separation pay. Results from the voluntary separation survey, auction simulations, and 
multivariate models addressed the primary and secondary research questions.  
The results indicated that there was a weak but positive correlation between a 
quality officer and his or her reservation value for separating from active duty. The 
finding supports prior quality adjusted discount auction research. Results from the 
auction simulations indicated that the uniform price quality adjusted discount auction has 
the potential to improve the average quality of officers retained in the military and reduce 
total separation cost (Table 10). Cost savings does not necessarily increase or decrease as 
we vary the assistance ($A) or quality threshold (q*). However, the QUAD auction is 
superior to a standard auction format in terms of both cost and quality control. The 
QUAD auction is very useful because it provides manpower planners the flexibility to set 
appropriate separation bonus amounts, number of separations, as well as average quality 
of officers retained. Quality gains and cost savings depend on the target separation goal, 
the predetermined quality rating, and the quality adjusted discount allowance. Unlike, a 
retention auction where higher quality officers receive higher retention bonuses, higher 
quality officers receive lower separation bonuses than lower quality officers in a quality 
adjusted auction for separation.  
The multivariate probit models found that expected civilian pay, personal 
discount rate, officers in the O-3 pay grade and officers in combat service support MOS 
had a positive and significant effect on participation in a voluntary separation program. 
This is an important finding because it supports the idea that individuals with higher 
reservation value, higher outside options and higher quality are presumably more likely 
to leave the military. Additionally, the study suggests that officers in combat arms MOS 
are more likely to remain on active duty. Marital status and Marines with a bachelor’s 
degree had a negative and significant effect on the probability of a Marine officer 
participating in a voluntary separation program. Again, it may be in the Marine Corps 
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best interest to retain highly qualified officers with higher levels of education. However, 
the study suggests that officers with more than a graduate education are more likely to 
leave the military. Ordinary least squares estimates found that that military occupational 
specialty, pay grade and personal discount rate had a negative and significant effect on an 
officer’s quality score rating. Race, and pay grade had a positive and significant effect on 
an officer quality score rating. Results of the ordinary least squares estimates on discount 
rate found that officers in aviation and combat service support military occupational 
specialties, and quality score had a negative and significant effect.  
Several findings were produced based on analysis of information collected in the 
voluntary separation survey. More than one-half of the survey participants reported they 
would not participate in a voluntary separation program offered by the Marine Corps. 
Participants indicated retirement benefits as the primary reason for choosing not to 
participate in a voluntary separation program. The average requested lump sum payment 
requested for voluntary separation was $284,000 compared to the previous $67,000 given 
under the special separation benefit program. Officers with 10 to 16 years of service 
requested significantly higher lump sum payments compared to those with less than 9 
years of service and more than 17 years of service, which is rational since officers with 
more years of service are closer to retirement. It was assumed the officers had higher 
reservation values to compensate for the loss of retirement pay they would waive by 
separating early from the military. The results indicated that 53.7 % of captains with 8 
years of service requested a lump sum payment of $100,000 or less. This amount is 
commensurate with the amount offered by the Air Force’s 2010 voluntary separation 
policy to officers in stated time in grade and explains the difference between the average 
of $284,000 lump sum request. The results showed that officers with 8 or less years of 
service had higher discount rates compared to those with 9 or more years of service. The 
result indicated that younger officers used a higher personal discount rate in their 
participation decision. Officers with 8 years of service had a preference for current 
dollars and were more likely to accept a lump sum payment for voluntary separation. 
Based on the results of the study, there was evidence to assist Marine manpower 
planners in predicting the appropriate incentive to induce voluntary separation. The study 
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provided actual data on a Marine’s reservation value for separating from the military, 
their discount rate, and the influence of personal traits on voluntary separation behavior. 
Having the ability to determine the approximate separation bonus that would be required 
to encourage Marines to voluntary separate from the military could aid manpower 
planners in developing appropriate and effective force-shaping policies.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The auction model presented in the study needs more experimental testing before 
it can be implemented. The auction assumed that participants in the survey identified 
their true reservation value for voluntary separation. This assumption can be erased in a 
controlled environment where participants are given counseling to explain the rules and 
bidding process in the auction. For the auction to be successful, Marines must participate 
in the auction, which requires knowing the bidding process and how the auction works. 
The study focused on a lump sum monetary incentive that would induce voluntary 
separation. While monetary rewards may induce voluntary separation, it is not the only 
reason. It is recommended that further research be conducted to identify whether a 
combination of monetary and nonpecuniary rewards would encourage more Marines to 
consider voluntary separation. It is recommended to conduct research to determine if a 
lump sum, or annuity incentive, were offered, then which incentive program a Marine 
likely would accept.  
 The researcher recommends conducting a Marine Corps wide survey similar to 
the one used in this study. A large scale survey could shed more light on the factors 
influencing the decision of service members to voluntary separate. For example, survey 
data examining general reservation values for separation, personal discount rates, 
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